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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,
v .

•

•

:
•

SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD;
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM;
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL;
MURRAY CITY JUSTICE COURT,

' "

:

' : '

:

•

•

Case No. 20020984-CA

:

Respondents/Appellees.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Post-conviction review is precluded only in those cases where the claim could
have been raised on direct appeal and unusual circumstances do not exist. In this case,
Lucero's claim that he was denied his right to counsel in the justice court could not have
been raised in a de novo appeal; post-conviction review is therefore appropriate.
Additionally, even if the claim could have been raised on appeal, unusual circumstances
allowing for collateral review exist based on the deprivation of the right to counsel.
Lucero did not make a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel. The
record fails to show, among other things, that Lucero understood the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Such an understanding is necessary for a knowing
and voluntary waiver regardless of whether a defendant pleads guilty or goes to trial.
POINT I. AN APPEAL WAS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO FILING THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN THIS CASE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The justice court argues for the first time on appeal that Lucero's claim that the
deprivation of counsel made his jail sentence illegal should not be reviewed because
Lucero should have appealed the justice court judgment. Justice court brief ("JCB") at
17. According to the justice court, the petition in this case was filed within the time for

*

filing a notice of appeal. The justice court claims that because Lucero failed to exhaust
the trial de novo appeal remedy, a petition for post-conviction relief requesting that the
4
jail sentence be vacated is not available to Lucero. The argument fails because (1)
Lucero's claim could not have been addressed in the trial de novo appeal proceeding; and
(2) unusual circumstances justifying extraordinary relief exist in this case. In addition,

*

the justice court's claim that Lucero could have filed an appeal on the date that he filed
the petition fails because it is an alternative ground for affirmance not raised below

(

which is not apparent from the record.
A. LUCERO IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM POST-CONVICTION
REVIEW BECAUSE HIS CLAIM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED
ON DIRECT APPEAL.

<

The Post Conviction Remedies Act and Utah case law preclude review in postconviction proceedings of only those claims that could have been raised on direct appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002); Rudolph v. Galetka . 2002 UT 7, J59 43 P.3d 467,
468 (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^6, 44 P.3d 626). Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a106 outlines the circumstances under which a petitioner is precluded from relief under
the Post Conviction Remedies Act, and precludes post-conviction review when a claim

2
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"could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal.11 Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3 5 a-106 (2002). Case law also holds that issues that "were not addressed on direct
appeal but could have been may not be raised for thefirsttime in a post-conviction relief
petition absent unusual circumstances." JCB at 18 (quoting Rudolph, 2002 UT 7, ^[5
(citing Carter, 2001 UT 96, ^6)) (emphasis added).
Lucero could not raise on direct appeal his claim that the justice court could not
sentence him to jail because he was denied his right to counsel. This is so because the
only appeal afforded justice court defendants is a trial de novo in district court. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-5-120(l)(a) (2002). In a de novo trial, judgment is vacated and a case
proceeds with a new proceeding on questions of both law and fact. See JCB at 19. Had
Lucero appealed to district court, he would have received a trial de novo and "his claim
of error would have ceased to exist" (JCB at 19) even though Lucero served more than
sixty days under the illegal sentence before hefiledthe petition in this case. This means
that Lucero's claim that the jail sentence must be stricken because it was imposed in
violation of the right to counsel could not be raised in a trial de novo . Because Lucero
could not raise this claim in a trial de novo proceeding, post-conviction review is
appropriate.
The justice court argues that Lucero "has tried to manipulate his sentence to avoid
incarceration" (JCB at 17) by challenging only the sentence and not the plea. While the
justice court is correct that Lucero has not challenged the plea in this case, Lucero has

3
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never conceded that the plea and conviction are valid, as argued by the justice court.
JCB at 17 (citing Appt. Brf. at 43). In fact, Lucero pointed out that the plea was taken in

*

violation of due process and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Appt. Brf.
at 43-44. Given the fact that Lucero had already served sixty days of the illegal sentence

|

along with the indication in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) that vacation of
the jail sentence is an appropriate remedy for the violation of the right to counsel, Lucero
4
challenged only the legality of his sentence in his petition for post-conviction relief.
Rather than being manipulation, Lucero's challenge of the illegal sentence appears
to be the only means to review the significant constitutional violation that occurred in

^

this case. If Lucero's only avenue for review were an appeal and subsequent trial
de novo, justice court judges could simply ignore the Sixth Amendment, due process and

.

other constitutional protections. Defendants, who would have only a trial de novo review
available under the justice court's argument, would have no means to challenge
I
unconstitutional actions by justice courts. Justice court judges could throw defendants in
jail without the benefit of any constitutional protections and defendants would simply be
allowed to appeal the conviction and get a trial de novo; if defendants missed the time for
filing an appeal, they would be stuck with the unconstitutional procedure, according to
the justice court's argument. In the meantime, defendants could serve weeks, months, or
even years in jail without ever having the opportunity to address the constitutionality of
the procedure that placed them there. A defendant who seeks to preserve his

4
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follow the protections and procedures that ensure fairness in our system.1
Moreover, the record fails to establish that the petition was filed within the time
period foi filii lg a i lotice of appeal ' 1 1 le justice coi irt makes this argumentforthe first

could have appealed. JCB at 20. The argument cannot be sustained, however, because it
is not apparent in the record or supported by the district court's factual findings. See
State v. Topanotes. 2003 I J 1 30. f ?, 480 I Jt; il i - \ d \ R e p . 1 8 .

. , •: . •

'

:;

affirmance cannot be embraced by an appellate court unless ftthe alternative ground is
apparent on the record1' and is "sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court.11 IdL.
' I he petition tl mt ga\ e i ise to this appeal v :

.

stamped in Third District

:

Court on August 1, 2002, almost sixty da>^ aite judgment was imposed R 1; 83.
Nevertheless, the justice court points to an entry in the justice court docket on July 3,
2002, which states that a petition for post-conviction relief or, in the alternative, motion
to correct IIICLMIIV i m p o s e d scnlence was filed

l( 1\ ,i( ,?0 III is HUH Icur Ironi llu e n t r v

1

Additionally, nothing in this record suggests Lucero was afforded counsel for an
appeal. The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) entered a limited appearance
of counsel for the sole purpose of vacating this illegally imposed sentence. The violation
of the right to counsel that occurred in the justice court also affected the exercise of the
right to appeal. See VonMoltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 719-20 (1948) (collateral
review was appropriate where defendant did not have lawyer for entry of plea and lawyer
was subsequently appointed for sole purpose of withdrawing plea and not for appeal).
5
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1

whether the petition was filed injustice court or elsewhere, or whether it was filed pro se
or with the assistance of counsel.
The docket also contains three more entries from July 15, 2002 through August 9,
2002, indicating that a petition or post-conviction relief or, in the alternative, motion to

M

correct illegally imposed sentence was filed. It is not clear from these entries whether
four different petitions were filed in the justice court, two of which were filed after the
i
petition was filed in the district court, or whether these entries were clerical errors.
Moreover, given the fact that the petition that gives rise to this appeal is date stamped
August 1, 2003, the justice court's argument that this petition was actually filed thirty

*

days earlier cannot be sustained. The factual uncertainties as to what, if anything, was
filed on July 3, 2002 preclude this Court from accepting the justice court's alternative

*

argument for affirmance. See Id. Had the justice court wanted to rely on this argument
that the petition was filed within the time Lucero could have filed a notice of appeal, it
i
needed to make the argument below, put on evidence regarding its claim as to when the
petition was actually filed, and obtain a factual finding as to the significance of the four
justice court docket entries. SeeI(L1t9.

^

Because Lucero could not raise the issue in this case on direct review, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-106 and Utah case law do not preclude review in post-conviction
proceedings. The petition in this case was not a substitute for appeal and instead was the
only means available for Lucero to request review of his illegally imposed sentence.
i

6
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B. ""UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING a )\ I A I MIAL
REVIEW EXIST IN THIS CASE.
While a petition for post-conviction relief was appropriately filed in this case
because the issile Lucero raises could not be reviewed on direct appeal, a petition is also
appropriate bn jiisr mini .u.illl i im uiirjam cs )!Js111\ my pist UHW it inn i n \c\\ \ \i\l mm lliis
case. f,[I]ssues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, but were not,
may not be raised for the first time in a habeas corpus proceeding, absent unusual
* iiniiimtanees "' Carter. 2WI III {U\< ^j1"» ' "1""r I he unusual circumstances test was
intended to assure I'umhimtMiliil linnnvi JIM) In iri|iiirr ieexaiiunalinii >f a vmt\ ulnnm in
habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged error was such that it would be
'unconscionable not to reexamine'

and thereby to assure that 'substantial justice

..'" Gardner v.Holden. 888 P.2d 608, 613 (I Jtah 1994) (quoting Hurst v.
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) (quoting Codianna \ . Morris , 660 I > 2d 1101,
« i n (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., concurring)). It "requires a showing of 'an obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right,'11 Gardner, 888
I > 2( I i H 613 (qi i<rtingHurst, 7 7 1 1 > 2< 1 \ it 1035)
Unusual circumstances justifying post-conviction review exist w he n there is an
allegation of ineffective assistance at trial and the same attorney represented the
defendant on appeal. Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7, f7, 43 P.3d 467; Gardner, 888
:

"d tit M.S. see also I Kali ( IMII Ann i;» /K-.^.Sa-1()(>(21 I Itnisiinl circumstances exist

ff

[b]ecause an attorney does not usually assert a claim of ineffectiveness on appeal on 1 lis
7
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or her part with respect to an error made at trial." Gardner. 888 P.2d at 615 (further
citation omitted). It would therefore be unfair to preclude collateral review of a claim
that the lawyer who represented the defendant at trial and on appeal was ineffective. In
fact, ,f[i]f counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive petitioner of the

M

effective assistance of counsel, they constitute[ ] a violation of due process that is clearly
reviewable . . . by postconviction review." Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105.
i
Unusual circumstances justifying collateral review likewise exist when a
defendant claims that he was denied the right to counsel at trial. See Codianna. 660 P.2d
at 1114-16 (Stewart, J., concurring); Brown v. Turner. 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 1968); Hawk

(

v. Turner. 326 U.S. 271 (1945). In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
deprivation of counsel in a state court proceeding amounts to a violation of due process
that allows for collateral review of a conviction. IdL. at 275, 278. It would be inherently
unfair and "unconscionable not to reexamine" a conviction where the defendant was
deprived of counsel, just as it is unconscionable not to reexamine a conviction where
there are allegations of ineffective assistance. In fact, when there was a total deprivation
of counsel, failure to reexamine the conviction creates a similar if not greater injustice as
that which occurs when there is an allegation of ineffective assistance.
In Brown, the defendant claimed that he had been denied his right to counsel and
was not properly advised regarding the consequences of his plea. Brown. 440 P.2d at
970. Although the Court denied Brown's claims, it reviewed those claims on the merits,

8
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justifying collateral review. Justice Stewart recognized this in his concurring opinion in
Codianna, stating:
In Brown this Court in fact addressed the merits of the habeas petitioner's
claims; it did not dismiss them solely on the ground that the alleged errors
were known or should have been known at the time of conviction. The
petitioner's claims in that case were that he had been denied his right to
counsel and that he was not properly advised of the consequences of his
plea of guilty A reading of the opinion makes clear that the petitioner
either knew or should have known at the time of his conviction of those
errors that were later asserted in his habeas petition. Although the Court
ruled that there is no merit to those claims, the critical point here is that the
Court deemed it entirely appropriate to address the merits even though
petitioner had failed to take a direct appeal.
Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., concurring); see. also Webster v. Jones, 587
P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (reviewing petitioner's claim in habeas petition that he was
depri\ eel of assistance of coi iiisel, on if i„e n lerits)
Although Webster also reviewed flu ;i I legation^ -

'

•.<..-

counsel on the merits, the justice court argues that Webster supports its argument that
unusual circumstances justifying collateral review do not exist in this case. JCB at 22:

• Webster along \\ it! i, I law k and Brown suppor t; the notion that an

allegation that a defendant was deprived of counsel constitutes an um isual, circi imstance
that allows for collateral review. While not artfully written, the analysis in Webster
demonstrates that the Court reviewed the claim on the merits pursuant to the unusual
cii ci II i istances test See Webster, 58 71!" 2d at 530. -

9
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Nor does Webster support the justice court's argument that Lucero was required
to appeal his conviction. While the Court did point out that Webster could have

*

appealed, the Court discussion regarding Webster's right to appeal was dictum since the
Court resolved Webster's claim by addressing the merits of whether he was denied his

-

right to counsel. Additionally, the Court did not analyze whether Webster would be able
to address his legal claim that he was deprived of counsel in an appeal or otherwise
<

discuss the nature of Webster's appeal right. Moreover, the decision in Webster was
issued prior to the passage of section 78-3 5a-106(1) and recent case law that makes it
clear that a person is precluded from collateral review based on the failure to file an

*

appeal only if the ground raised by the person could have been raised in an appeal. See
e.g. Rudolph. 2002 UT 7, ^[5; Carter. 2001 UT 96, ^6. In this case where Lucero could
not have raised this claim in a trial de novo appeal and the claim that he was deprived of
counsel is a recognized "unusual circumstance1' that justifies collateral review, Webster
does not aid the justice court's argument.
The justice court disregards case law holding that the deprivation of counsel is an
unusual circumstance that justifies collateral review and instead argues that Lucero has
not shown any injustice because he would have pled guilty and received the same
sentence even if he had counsel. JCB at 21. This claim is merely speculation as to what
would have occurred had Lucero been afforded his right to counsel. In addition, the fact
that Lucero chose not to attack the plea after he had served a significant amount of time

10
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<

and had the alternative remedy of attackii ig; the jail sentence m ailable does lie t •
demonstrate that he would not have fought this charge and perhaps prevailed had he had
a lawyer in the justice court.
!\ loreo v ei , the ji istice coi 11. t's ai gi 11 1 lei it that I ucero w as 1 lot prejudiced b>< the
deprivation of counsel ignores the fact that deprivation of the right d \ 0111 isd

.:

11

subject to a harmless error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 309-311
(1991) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). Instead, deprivation <>f
coi insel is stri icti 11 al ei 1 c 1 that permeates ai 1 entii e proceeding and requires relief
regardless of whether a defendant can show prejudice. IcL_; see,, also State v. Russell , 91 7
P.2d 557, 560 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The justice court's argument disregards the
importance of the right to counsel and conflicts with established precedent that
-•J •

*n*

egardles^

hetherthe

defendant can show harm. Case law makes it clear that in a case where the defendant
was deprived of his right to counsel, unusual circumstances allow for collateral review.
C. PETITIONER IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE A PRELIMINARY
SHOWING AS TO WHY HE DID NOT APPE AI IN ORDER TO
PURSUE COLLATERAL RELIEF.
As a final matter, the justice court argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction
over this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief because "Lucero gave no
explanation why he failed to take a direct appeal." JCB

* \ ccording to the justice

< • ' Wells \ Sh.til.seii., 74 71 > 2< i 1042 (I II ah 1987)

summers v. Cook.' 759 1 1 2d 3 11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Utah Ct. App. 1988) require a defendant who has not appealed but files a petition for
post-conviction review to explain why he did not directly appeal the conviction, and that
in the absence of such an explanation, courts do not have jurisdiction over the collateral
proceedings. JCB at 24. The justice court's argument misapprehends the requirements

|

for post-conviction review and misinterprets Wells and Summers. Additionally, the
record in this case adequately demonstrates why an appeal was not filed.
i

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002), enacted in 1996 after the decisions in Wells
and Summers, does not require a petitioner to put on evidence as to why he did not
appeal. Instead, the statute makes it clear that a person is precluded from post-conviction

'

relief based on the failure to file an appeal only if the ground raised in the petition "could
have been but was not raised . . . on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c).

<

Additionally, the statute indicates that even if the ground could have been but was not
raised on appeal, a person may nevertheless pursue the issue in post-conviction
proceedings "if the failure to raise the ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2). Rather than requiring the preliminary
showing argued by the justice court, the statute requires that the record demonstrate that
the issue could not have been raised on direct appeal or that unusual circumstances exist.
Case law likewise does not require an explanation from petitioner as to why he
did not appeal. Instead, as previously outlined, case law requires only that issues that
"were not addressed on direct appeal, but could have been raised may not be raised for

12
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the first time in a post-conviction relief petition absent unusual circumstances."
Rudolph, 2002 UT 7, ^[5 (citing Carter. 2001 UT 96, ^6). Wells and Summers do not
change this result.
Wells is a per curiam decision that echoes the rule outlined above that in cases
where an issue could have been raised on appeal but was not, collateral review is not
appropriate except in unusual circumstances. Wells, 747 P.2d at 1044. Wells could have
addressed his claim on appeal and failed to explain why he did not appeal. IdL
Additionally, the record did "not divulge a cause for the procedural default or an obvious
injustice or prejudicial denial of a constitutional right...." Id. The Court therefore
refused to review the claim because Wells could have raised it on appeal and the record
did not demonstrate unusual circumstances. Wells simply says that in that case where the
issue could have been reached on direct appeal, petitioner's failure to outline unusual
circumstances for not appealing precluded collateral review.
Summers also outlined the relevant requirements for collateral review, pointing
out in cases where the issue could have been raised on direct review, collateral review is
not appropriate unless there are unusual circumstances. Summers, 759 P.2d at 343-44.
In Summers, there were unusual circumstances because the petitioner claimed that his
right to effective assistance in taking an appeal was violated. IcL. Because unusual
circumstances existed based on the deprivation of his right to counsel, this Court
concluded that "meaningful habeas corpus review is appropriate in this case to assure
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fundamental fairness." Id at344.
Neither Summers nor Wells requires a petitioner to make a threshold showing as
to why he did not appeal in order to pursue post-conviction relief. Instead, both cases are
consistent with the Post Conviction Remedies Act and case law by requiring defendants
who could have raised the issue on direct appeal but who did not file an appeal to
demonstrate unusual circumstances justifying collateral review.
Moreover, while Lucero could not have raised this issue on direct appeal and
therefore is not required to demonstrate unusual circumstances, the record nevertheless
shows that unusual circumstances justifying collateral review exist in this case where
Lucero was deprived of his right to counsel; see. Appt. brf. at 14-50. The fact that the
justice court did not argue below that Lucero was required to appeal this case coupled
with the district court judge's consideration of the claim on the merits without any
questions as to whether Lucero was procedurally barred from pursuing collateral relief
demonstrates that it was obvious to the parties and judge below that collateral review was
warranted not only because Lucero could not have raised this issue on appeal but also
because unusual circumstances allowed for collateral review.
Finally, the justice court's claim that a failure to put on evidence as to why
petitioner did not appeal deprives the post-conviction court of jurisdiction is being raised
for the first time on appeal. As previously outlined, in order to affirm on a ground not
argued below, the alternative ground must be apparent in the record and sustainable on
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the factual findings entered by the lower court. See. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 9;
discussion supra at 5. It is not apparent from this record that Lucero has not
demonstrated why he did not file an appeal; indeed, the record adequately demonstrates
that he was not provided counsel; see. Appt. brf. at 14-50. Moreover, the judge's factual
findings do not address this issue. Given the fact that the judge could find on this record
that an adequate showing was made, the justice court's attempt to resolve this case on
this alternative ground should be rejected.
As the justice court acknowledges, a trial de novo would not allow for review of
Lucero's claim and instead would brush it away as if the constitutional violation had not
occurred. Because the appeal available to Lucero did not allow for a review of the legal
claim raised in his petition, this is not a claim that could have been raised on direct
appeal. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 and case law, Lucero is therefore not
precluded from raising this claim in a post-conviction writ. Additionally, unusual
circumstances based on the deprivation of counsel allow for collateral review.
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT LUCERO MADE A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID WAIVER
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Lucero continues to maintain the arguments outlined in subsection (3) of his
opening brief that at most a review of the justice court "record" as a whole should be
made in determining whether a justice court defendant has waived the right to counsel.
See Appt. brf. at 22-29. Regardless of whether this Court agrees, however, the bottom
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line in this case is that even if all of the evidence presented at the post-conviction
proceeding is considered along with the justice court docket, the evidence failed to

*

demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.
Utah case law is clear that in determining whether there is a constitutionally valid

.

waiver of counsel, the "focus is not solely on the trial court's express advice," but also on
"whether the colloquy clearly established the defendant's level of understanding." State
v. Petty. 2001 UT App 396, ^[6, 38 P.3d 998, cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002); see
also State v. Balderrama. 2003 UT App 139, No. 20020786 (UT App. May 8, 2003)
(unpublished). In making its argument that Lucero made a constitutionally adequate
waiver of his right to counsel, the justice court disregards the second half of this inquiry,
instead focusing on what the justice court told Lucero. JCB at 29-30. This failure of the
justice court to point to any portion of the justice court record or evidence presented at
the habeas hearing that demonstrated that Lucero understood the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se precludes a determination that Lucero knowingly and
voluntarily waived the right to counsel.
In an effort to overcome the fact that the record does not show that the justice
court focused on Lucero's level of understanding or attempted to clarify that Lucero
understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, the justice court seems
to argue that informing a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se is not necessary when the defendant pleads guilty. See. JCB at 32. This argument
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disregards controlling case law and instead relies on obscure, inapplicable decisions from
other jurisdictions. Moreover, even if a trial court need not directly inform a defendant
of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, the record must show that the
defendant understands those dangers and disadvantages for there to be a valid waiver of
counsel.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that "[a] waiver of the constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel is of no less moment to an accused who must decide whether to
plead guilty than to an accused who stands trial." Von Moltke v. Gillies. 332 U.S. 708,
722 (1948); see Appt. brf. At 20-22. This is so because a lawyer is critical in helping a
defendant determine whether the state can convict him, whether there is a defense to the
charge, what evidence would be admissible, and other matters that should be understood
by a defendant before pleading guilty. Id, Moreover, a lawyer can present mitigating
circumstances and possible sentencing alternatives after a defendant is convicted. IcL
Hence, even when a plea is involved, the High Court requires Ma penetrating and
comprehensive examination of all of the circumstances," including "apprehension [by
the defendant] of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them,
the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and
circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding
of the whole matter." Id. at 724 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court requires a
focus on the defendant's level of understanding, including understanding the dangers and
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disadvantages of proceeding pro se, in cases where a defendant pleads guilty. I d .
The Utah Supreme Court likewise requires the same "penetrating and
comprehensive examination11 (id.) for there to be a valid waiver of counsel when a plea is
involved as is required when there is a trial. See. State v. Arguelles, 2002 UT 104, Tf70,
459 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. In determining whether Arguelles made a valid waiver of counsel
before pleading guilty, the Court applied the same analysis it applies when determining
whether a defendant waived counsel in a trial context. Id. In fact, although Arguelles
pleaded guilty, the Supreme Court made it clear that the analysis set forth in State v.
Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) and Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
applied with full force in Arguelles. The Court stated:
We have held that before a defendant can waive the right to counsel,
the defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. State v. Frampton, 737
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) (quoting Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806,
835, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975) (internal quotation omitted)).
f,

Arguelles, 2002 UT 104, f70. In the face ofVonMoltke and the Utah Supreme Court's
application of Faretta and the requirement that the defendant be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation for there to be a valid waiver in cases
where the defendant pleads guilty, the justice court's reliance on decisions from three
state courts of appeals refusing to apply Faretta when a plea is involved is not persuasive.
See JCB at 32-33 and cases cited in footnote 122.
The justice court also suggests that State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 785 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1996) supports its claim that a judge need not inform a defendant of the dangers
and disadvantages of proceeding pro se for there to be a valid waiver. JCB at 32.
Although this Court was troubled in McDonald because the trial judge omitted the
recommendation against self-representation outlined in Frampton, it nevertheless
recognized that in some circumstances a record will demonstrate that the defendant
understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation in the absence of such a
warning. Id, This Court pointed out that such a recommendation "best ensures that the
defendant will understand the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se,f and
strongly recommended that trial courts give such a warning. IcL Despite the fact that the
trial court in McDonald did not express the preferred warning against self-representation,
however, this Court concluded that the record nevertheless "reveal[ed] defendant
understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se." IdL Rather than doing
away with the requirement that the trial court ascertain that a defendant understands the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel for there to be a valid waiver,
McDonald emphasizes the importance of that requirement, but recognizes that a
defendant can understand such dangers and disadvantages under certain circumstances in
the absence of the preferred warning.
In this case, the trial court not only failed to make the preferred recommendation
against self-representation, it also failed to assess Lucero's level of understanding. In
fact, the justice court docket demonstrates Lucero's lack of understanding of the dangers
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and disadvantages of proceeding pro se since, among other things, it shows that Lucero
thought he could just pay a fine if he pled guilty.

*

The justice court has made no effort to argue on appeal that the trial judge
ascertained or that the record shows that Lucero understood the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Instead, it simply argues that an express
recommendation against self-representation is not required. Regardless of whether an
express recommendation is required, the record must reveal that the trial court
ascertained that the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se. McDonald. 922 P.2d at 785. As set forth in Appt. brf. at 33-34, 39-45, the trial
court did not inform Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, did
not ascertain that Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to proceed without
counsel, and did not ascertain that Lucero understood the elements of the crime, possible
defenses, the potential penalty, and other facts necessary for an understanding of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. Lucero's last involvement in
the criminal justice system had been in the 1970fs, about thirty years ago. He incorrectly
thought he could just pay a fine, perhaps because thirty years ago that was the case for a
DUI charge. The judge told him he could have an attorney if he could not afford one,
then refused to appoint an attorney even though Lucero was indigent. In this case, where
the record fails to reveal that Lucero understood the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding without counsel, the lower court erred in concluding that Lucero knowingly
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and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
A statement that a defendant waives the right to counsel does not establish a
knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. See generally Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 72324 (holding that defendant did not make a valid waiver of counsel even though defendant
had indicated that she waived counsel). To discharge the duty of obtaining a
constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel," [a] judge must investigate as long
and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an
accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this
right does not automatically end the judge's responsibility." L±_
This Court has recently reiterated the idea that a constitutionally valid waiver does
not exist simply because a defendant indicates that he understands the right and waives it.
State v. Lara. 2003 UT App 318,ffl[14-15,2003 UT App. WL 2208354. This Court
noted that under certain circumstances, "unequivocal statements of knowing and
voluntary waiver" do not amount to constitutionally valid waivers, stating:
[W]e note that in other contexts, unequivocal statements of knowing and
voluntary waiver have been set aside. See e.g.. State v. Norris, 2002 UT
App 305, f 13, 57 P.3d 238 (allowing defendant to withdraw conditional
guilty plea in spite of flawless plea colloquy and defendant's own assertion
that plea was made knowingly and voluntarily where court and State made
unrealizable promises in exchange for plea); State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d
371, 375 (Utah 1996) (holding guilty plea was not knowing because
defendant did not understand the elements of the crime, in spite of
defendant's unequivocal statements to the contrary).
L±,T[17,n.2.
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Despite the fact that unequivocal statements of waiver do not amount to
constitutionally valid waivers, the justice court argues, relying on United States v.
Weniger. 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980), that an
explicit statement of waiver is not required to find a constitutionally valid waiver of
counsel when a defendant refuses to obtain counsel. See JCB at 31. Weniger fails to
support the justice court's argument, however, because it involves different
circumstances from those in the present case. In Weniger, the defendant was a
millionaire who repeatedly delayed proceedings and made it clear that he "had no
intention of hiring a lawyer unless the lawyer agreed with his views about the invalidity
of the tax laws." Id. at 166. Weniger had a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel,
"was made ' aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,'" (icL at 167
(citations omitted)), the judge begged Weniger to obtain an attorney, and Weniger
"strategically chose to appear pro se." IcL at 167. By contrast, the record in this case
shows that Lucero was not informed of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se, was not advised against self-representation, was not able to retain counsel
because he was indigent, and did not otherwise comprehend the risks of proceeding
pro se. While Weniger does indicate that in extreme cases the circumstances may
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel when a defendant
refuses to retain counsel, it has no application in this case.
Finally, the justice court argues that because Lucero has not challenged the guilty
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plea in this case, he waived the right to counsel. JCB at 33-34. In support of this
argument, the justice court plucks a portion of a statement made by Lucero's counsel at
the beginning of the proceedings in which counsel outlined the nature of the proceeding
for the post-conviction judge. The justice court quotes only part of counsel's statement
and fails to acknowledge that portions of the statement were inaudible, thereby leaving a
huge question as to the true nature of counsel's statement. The justice court also ignores
the context in which this statement was made and ignores the fact that the parties and
judge understood that Lucero was challenging the constitutional validity of the waiver
but choosing not to attack the plea because Shelton provided that remedy and Lucero had
already served significant jail time. The justice court's argument that this Court should
ignore the constitutional invalidity of the waiver of counsel in this case because of this
statement is therefore not persuasive.
The statement that the justice court thinks resolves this case was made at the start
of the post-conviction proceedings when counsel was attempting to clarify for the judge
the nature of the hearing. The post-conviction judge asked, M[w]hat kind of animal are
we dealing with here? So, it's not a habeas, so I'm not going to go under 65, it's not
that. And is it - - is it a motion to withdraw a plea? Is it a motion to correct sentence?
Is - - what is this?" R. 116:6. Counsel responded that "it would probably be
characterized as a habeas motion" and that it was not a motion to correct an illegal
sentence or a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. R. 116:6. She responded further,
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"we're not asking that Mr. Lucero's plea or conviction be upset. We believe those under
(inaudible) and Shelton are proper and valid" R. 116:6 (emphasis added).
The statement itself fails to say that Lucero believed the plea was valid. Instead, it
simply informed the post-conviction court that Lucero was not attacking the plea. Given
the inaudible portions of this statement, it is just as likely that Lucero's counsel was
saying that attacking just the sentence when a defendant has been sentenced to jail in
violation of the right to counsel is "proper and valid" under Shelton . Because the
statement does not clearly indicate that Lucero conceded the validity of the plea, the
justice court's argument in this part has no merit.
Additionally, taken in context, it is clear that the parties and judge below
understood the statement to mean that Lucero did not want his plea withdrawn but
believed that pursuant to the Shelton, due process, and the Sixth Amendment, it was
appropriate to vacate the remainder of his jail sentence based on the significant
constitutional violation that occurred in this case. In fact, after making the statement,
Lucero's counsel immediately stated, "[o]ur contention just is that the jail sentence was
illegal at the time it was imposed and that the suspended portion remains illegal at this
point." R. 116:6. Moreover, counsel for the justice court understood Lucero's position
below, but argued that if the post-conviction court concluded that the right to counsel

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had been violated, the plea must be vacated.2 R. 116:7. The post-conviction judge also
understood Lucero's position, recognizing that if he were to determine a constitutional
violation, the next issue would be to decide the proper remedy for that violation.
R. 116:7. The justice court's argument for the first time on appeal that counsel's
statement acts as some sort of a concession on the waiver of counsel argument is not well
taken in light of the fact that the parties and judge understood below that Lucero was
seeking vacation of the jail sentence as the remedy for the violation of his right to
counsel.
In this case where the record fails to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the right to counsel, the lower court erred in concluding that Lucero waived that right.
Pursuant to Shelton, due process and the Sixth Amendment, Lucero respectfully requests
that the lower court's decision be overturned and his jail sentence vacated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Benjamin Frank Lucero respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
lower court's decision and order that his jail sentence be vacated.

2

The justice court does not make this argument on appeal and does not counter
Lucero's claim that in the event this Court agrees that Lucero's right to counsel was
violated, the jail sentence must be vacated in this case.
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